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MA.JOR LEAGUE TEAM SPORTS 
Roger G. Noll* 
The major league sports industry is an exceptionally 
interesting subj ect for economic study . Its allure for economists 
does not lie in its size , for by any reasonable measure the team 
sports industry is not big business . The total revenue of all teams 
in the five major team sports--baseball ,  basketball , football , hockey, 
and soccer�is less than half the revenue of such mundane endeavors as 
the manufacture of cardboard boxes or the canning of fruits and 
vegetables . Pro teams have revenues ranging approximately from those 
of a large gas station to those of a department store or large 
supermarket . 
The team sports business is interesting to economists 
primarily because of the complex operating rules and special legal 
status of the industry . Nearly every phase of the operations of a 
team or a league is influenced by practices and rules that limit 
economic competition within the industry . In most cases,  government 
has either sanctioned or failed to attack effectively these 
anticompetitive practices.  Consequently, professional team sports 
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provides economists with a unique opportunity to study the operation 
and performance of an effective , wel l-organized cartel . 
THE MARKET STRUCTURE OF MAJOR LEAGUE SPORTS 
As do most businesses,  a sports team operates in several 
market s ,  some of which are local and some of which are national. The 
most important product markets are the sale of admissions and 
concessions at home contests and the sale of the right to broadcast 
play-by-play accounts of game s .  The most important input markets are 
the acquisition of skilled professional players and of a facility for 
staging contests . The characteristics of each of these four markets 
are somewhat different , so that each must be examined separately . In 
general , although 122 minor league teams operated in the five sports 
in 1980 ,  rarely would more than a few find themselves competing in a 
particular market .  
The Player Market 
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Although a few especially gifted athletes can play at the 
highest professional level in more than one sport,  such individuals 
are extremely rare. Consequently , each sport has essentially a 
separate player market through which teams acquire athletes with 
skills specific to that sport.  All teams conduct international 
searches for player s .  Even the uniquely American game o f  football has 
engaged in an international search for talent since the 1 960s when it 
found a productive use for European soccer players as place kicker s .  
Superficially, the structure of the player market appears 
competitive.  In each sport,  twenty-five to thirty firms all employ 
approximately equal numbers of athletes ;  concentration ratios on the 
demand side of these markets are therefore quite low. On the supply 
side, a tiny proportion of the population is skillful enough to play 
major league athletics , and only a handful have the ability to become 
stars . Still in any year the number of,  say , .300 hitters in baseball 
or 50-yards-per-game running backs in football is sufficiently 
numerous that the market is likely to be reasonably competitive. 
Despite these appearances ,  the player market is not 
competitive. Although the details differ from sport to sport,  
profes sional sports leagues all have some version of a "player 
reservation system"--a mechanism for reducing the competition for 
players among teams in the league . 
Leagues have separate rules for regulating competition for 
three types of players : "rookies , "  players about to begin a 
professional career ; veterans whose present team desires to retain 
their services ; and veterans who are no longer wanted by their current 
employer . The effect of all three systems is to divide as many 
players as pos sible from the relevant pool of present and potential 
major league players into separate submarkets--one for each team--in 
which each team has an exclusive bargaining right with the players 
assigned to its submarket.  
The method for allocating exclusive bargaining rights for 
rookies is the free agent draft. In every sport at a specified time 
during the year--typically at the conclusion of the high school and 
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college season in the same sport�teams in each league, normally in 
reverse order of finish during the previous season, select players 
from among eligible amateur athletes to be added to their "reserve 
list . "  A player may then negotiate only with the team that selected 
him, and in all sports except baseball rights to negotiate with the 
player perpetually belong to the selecting team unless it trades or 
sells those rights to another member of the league . In baseball,  if a 
player does not sign a contract with the team that drafted him within 
six months his name returns to the list of athletes eligible for the 
draft .  
In all sports a veteran player has some freedom to change 
teams even if his current employer wants to retain the rights to his 
services . This is done by exercising the "option" to "play out" his 
contract and become a "free agent . "  What this means is that a player 
can gain his freedom to negotiate with another team by playing an 
additional year in baseball,  football and basketball,  an additional 
two years in soccer , or an additional three years in hockey under 
terms specified in his last contract .  In baseball,  a player must also 
have six years of experience to be eligible for free agency . 
After playing out his option, a player is not completely 
unencumbered in his ability to negotiate a job with a different 
employer . In football and hockey, and in basketball through 1 981 , the 
team that signs the player who has played out his option must 
indemnify the team that he left with some combination of players,  
draft choices and cash that compensates his old  team for its  loss  due 
to his departure . In football,  compensation is determined by a 
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formula that is negotiated with the players' association. The 
compensation is the assignment of rights to draft choices,  with the 
amount of compensation determined by the experience and playing time 
of the player who plays out his option. In basketball through 1 981 
and hockey, the amount of compensation is determined by the 
Commissioner of the spor t .  Although few cases have arisen in these 
sports , the 1 979 Bill Walton case illustrates the use of the 
compensation system to punish severely teams that sign a free agent . 
NBA Commissioner Larry O'Brien awarded Walton's old team, the Portland 
Trail Blazers,  several key players from San Diego , the team that 
signed him, even though Walton' s ability to play, owing to a foot 
injury , was highly questionable ( indeed, Walton played only a few 
games for San Diego , and his career remains in jeopardy) . 
The compensation requirement--called the "Rozelle Rule" after 
its inventor, Commis sioner Pete Rozelle of the National Football 
League--reduces the amount a team is willing to pay a player who has 
played out his option, and thereby the wage that he will obtain in the 
competition for his services .  As of 1 980 , baseball and soccer had no 
compensation rule;  however , in collective bargaining , baseball owners 
are trying to obtain it .  In basketball,  the compensation system ends 
in 1 981 unless the players agree to extend it as part of the 
col lective bargaining agreement . In basketball,  all that is scheduled 
to remain after 1981 is the right of a player's team to keep him by 
matching the offer he receives from a competitor . In baseball,  the 
only factors now limiting competition for veteran free agents in 
baseball are that only twelve teams are al lowed to compete for any 
given player , and that each team is limited in the number of free 
agents that it can sign . Both rules have proven to be too lax to be 
effective in limiting significantly the salaries of player s .  
Even the limited freedom o f  veterans to switch teams i s  a 
relatively recent event. In the early days of team sports , the rights 
to a player were perpetual . Once a player signed his first contract , 
the rights to negotiate with him were thereafter the exclusive 
property of a single team as long as the terms of his contract were 
satisfied . This situation changed in the mid-1 970s in all sports,  
largely because of  efforts of players' unions through antitrust 
actions and collective bargaining , a topic to which we will return 
later . 
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The effects of baseball's relatively liberal system of free 
agency--including its absence of compensation--has been dramatic . In 
1 970 , the mean salary of baseball players was approximately $45 ,000 , 
and only a handful of players earned more than $100 ,000 . By contrast , 
the salaries of the opening-day lineup of the Philadelphia Phillies in 
1980 were as follows : 
lB Pete Rose $800 ,000 
2B Manny Trillo 400 ,000 
SS Larry Bowa 400 ,000 
3B Mike S chmidt 560 ,000 
LF Greg Luzinski 350 ,000 
CF Garry Maddox 425 ,000 
RF Bake McBride 400 ,000 
c Bob Boone 600 ,000 
p Steve Carlton 400 ,000 
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The average salary for the entire team, including second line players , 
was well over $200 ,000 . All of the starting lineup of the Phillies 
are veteran players who either have gone through the free agent 
process or who have been induced to stay out of the free agent process 
by the Phillies because of lucrative contract offer s .  The obvious 
affect of the free agency system in baseball has been a dramatic 
increase in the pay of veteran player s .  The player market monopsony 
in baseball is now confined to players in the first few years of their 
career s .  O f  course,  because the median duration o f  a baseball career 
is about f ive years , it is still true that the majority of players 
never have the opportunity to enter a competitive player market . The 
primary beneficiaries of the free agent system are the star players 
who enjoy long career s .  
In a l l  sports,  i f  a team no longer wants t o  retain the 
services of a player, several pos sibilities are available.  First,  the 
team may trade the player to another team for other players and/or 
draft choice s .  Second, the team may s e l l  the rights t o  negotiate with 
the player to another team. In baseball a player with ten years' 
experience has the right to veto the assignment of his contract to any 
particular team, and in soccer players can refuse assignment to teams 
outside of Canada and the United States . In other sports some players 
have succeeded in including similar rights in their contract s .  
Nevertheless , even in these cases the player cannot negotiate with 
several teams while a trade is pending and then veto all proposed 
trades except one to the team he favors .  A player may never negotiate 
with any team while under contract to another , and must decide whether 
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to veto a trade without discussing the matter with any team other than 
his current employer . And , for all but the handful of players with 
veto rights , a player has no alternatives other than playing for the 
team that acquires his contract or retiring from the league . 
The third alternative for a team wishing to remove a player 
from its roster is to place him on "waivers . "  The waiver list is a 
pool of players available for drafting by other teams , again in 
reverse order of finish . Each team in the same league then decides 
whether to claim the player on waivers at a price specified in league 
rules . The price varies from $100 in football and soccer to $20 ,000 
in baseball.  Only if  all  teams decide not to claim the player for 
this price does he then become a free agent , available to negotiate 
with any team he chooses . Of course,  the amount of salary increase he 
can expect i s ,  to say the leas t ,  limited once he has been released by 
his present team after all other teams have decided against obtaining 
him by trade, purchase or waiver . 
The sports with extensive minor leagues�baseball and hockey 
--have an additional set of rules for preventing competition for minor 
league professionals . These rules are similar to those regulating the 
acquisition of rookies and waivered veterans , with a player becoming 
eligible for a drafting procedure at certain stages of his career or 
when a major league club for whom he is under contract removes him 
from its roster of reserved player s .  Soccer , a sport in which major 
leagues are organized throughout the world , has an international 
player reservation system as well as a national one . The numerous 
foreign players on U . S .  and Canadian teams have been acquired from 
foreign teams through rules governing the transfer of veteran 
contracts that are similar to the rules described above.  
The effect of this labyrinth of rules is to grant each team a 
monopsony in an artifically created submarket of the market for 
player s .  This monopsony is broken only when a new league emerge s .  
Although a new league nearly always adopts rules dividing the player 
market among its teams , interleague competition still emerges . A 
player will be drafted by one team in each league , and these two teams 
will then engage in duopsonistic competition for his services . Two 
competitor s ,  of course,  constitute a far cry from perfect competition. 
Even so , the effect of a new league on salaries is dramatic , usually 
leading to a doubling of salaries within the first year or two .  For 
example, the following are the salary increments enjoyed by three 
players as a result of the emergence of the World Hockey Association 
in 1 97 2 .  
Player 
Gerry Cheevers 
John McKenzie 
Derek Sanderson 
Salary ( dollars)_} 
1 971-72 1972-73 1 972-73 
(NHL) (WHA) (NHL offer) 
$57 , 500 
48 ,000 
50 ,000 
$200 ,000 
100 ,000 
300 ,000 
$ 70 ,000 
100 ,000 
80 ,000 
_} Taken from contracts submitted in evidence in Philadelphia 
World Hockey Club, Inc . v .  Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc . ,  U . S . D . C .  
Eastern Pennsylvania C . A .  72-1661 and Boston Professional Hockey 
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Association v. Derek Sanderson, U . S .D . C .  Mas sachusetts C .A. 7 2-2490c .  
More generally, after the formation of the American Basketball 
Association, the median player salary rose by 60 percent from 1 967 to 
1 97 1 .  Even more dramatic was the effect of the formation of the World 
Hockey Association in 1 97 2 .  Average NHL salaries increased from 
$24 ,000 in 1 97 1-72 to $40 ,000 in 1 972-73 . _J
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_J For salary data , see James G. S coville ,  "Labor Relations in
Sports , "  in Roger G .  Noll ,  editor , Government and the Sports Business , 
Brookings Institution , 1 974,  p .  1 93 ff . 
These figures illustrate the value of the player reservation 
system to teams . The system gives each team a property right in the 
players on its roster .  The value of that property right i s  the 
discounted present value of the sum of difference in the player' s 
competitive wage and the wage that is actually paid over his remaining 
career ._) Trades of players , many of which involve cash payments ,
_J The discounted present value of a stream of revenues
through time is the amount a prudent investor would pay today to earn 
those revenues ,  given the current rate of interest. For example,  if 
someone will pay $10 per year forever and if the interest rate at 
which money can be borrowed or lent is 10 percent , then a prudent 
investor should be willing to pay $100 for the right to receive $10 
annually .  The formula for calculating present value (PV) from a 
stream of revenues (Ri) in each of n years is:
PV 
n R. 
l. 
=L -- i 
i=l (1 + r)
where r is the rate of interest . 
represent the purchase and sale of this "property. "  
The player reservation system as practiced by sports leagues 
is a classic case of a restraint of trade through the division of 
markets and agreements not to compete , and as such is a textbook 
example of a violation of the antitrust statutes .  Although leagues 
maintain that these restraints are reasonable�an issue we shall 
explore when we consider the industry' s conduct and performance--
all standing court precedents conclude that they are anticompetitive . 
Only baseball has specifically had its player reservation 
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system exempted from antitrust prosecution. This exemption dates from 
the days of the Federal League which attempted to become a third major 
league just prior to the outbreak of World War I .  The Federal League 
was frustrated in this effort by the reserve clause ,  which prevented 
its acquisition of established major league players . In an ensuing 
antitrust case the Federal League attempted to undo the reserve 
system.-
1 
The court ruled that baseball was exempt from 
_J Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U . S .  200 
0922) . 
antitrust prosecution because it was not engaged in interstate 
co111111erce and, therefore, was beyond the scope of federal regulatory 
law .  Interestingly, the district court judge in the case was Kenesaw 
Mountain Landis who became Co111111issioner of baseball shortly 
thereafter.  
The second attack on  baseball's reserve clause was launched in 
the late 1940s when another league, this time in Mexico, tried to 
attain major league status . Major league baseball could not enforce 
its reserve clause in Mexico, but it did rule that players signing 
with the Mexican League would forever thereafter be barred from 
American organized basebal l .  Two cases  emerged from this action, but 
one never came to trial as baseball lifted its suspension of the 
plaintiff player ._} In the other case, the Supreme Court steadfastly 
_J Gardella v.  Chandler, 172  F .  2d 402 ( 2d Circuit 1949 ) .  
stuck to the baseball exemption, although it disagreed with the 
earlier decision._} The Court found unacceptable the earlier ruling 
_J Toolson v.  New York Yankees, 346 U . S .  3 56 ( 1 953 ) .  
that baseball was not interstate commerce, but took Congress' 
subsequent failure to reverse the Court by specifically incorporating 
baseball into the coverage of the antitrust statutes as an implied 
Congressional exemption of the sport.  The Court also ruled that to 
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reverse itself more than thirty years later would be unfair to 
investors who had entered the industry expecting the antitrust 
exemption to remain. 
The third major challenge to the reserve clause was offered by 
Curt Flood, "a grand little center fielder"_} for the S t .  Louis 
_J According to columnist  Red Smith, New York Times, June 21, 
1 972. 
Cardinals, who decided to retire to Majorca rather than play in 
Philadelphia, the city to which he was traded by the Cardinals .  Once 
again, the Supreme Court upheld the exemption, although this time it 
removed yet another reason for its support�that investors deserved a 
consistent policy ._} The Court recognized that having enjoyed 
_J Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U . S . 258 ( 1972) . 
monopoly rights in the past  is no argument for continuing to enjoy 
them in the futur e ;  however, the Court continued to pass  the buck by 
arguing that Congress had had over fifty years to reverse the Court if 
it had seen fit to do so . 
This last reed upon which the baseball exemption is based is 
weak, indeed, and a good candidate for future reversal . (In fact, 
William 0 .  Douglas, who voted with the majority in Toolson, switched 
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sides in the five-to-three Flood decision . )  The failure of Congress 
to act is not equivalent in content to the passage of a specific 
exemption since it could have numerous explanations . The failure to 
enact an exemption could stem from an implicit decision in Congress to 
concern itself with more important matters than overturning a bad 
Court decision in an economically unimportant industry . Congress has 
exempted numerous business  activities from antitrust liability, 
including agricultural marketing cooperatives and most  regulated 
industrie s .  Thus the Court could just as easily conclude that the 
failure of Congress to act implies that it is less enthusiastic about 
a baseball exemption than about all the other exemptions that have 
been enacted . Finally, the Court itself does not fol low this line of 
reasoning in other cases . Many major Supreme Court decisions--school 
desegregation; one-man, one-vote;  the rights of those arrested�are 
reversals of earlier Court decisions to which Congress  made no 
responsE . 
In other sports, the courts  have been unwilling to exempt 
player reservation systems from antitrust liability. The National 
Football League (NFL) employed a baseball-like reserve system until it 
lost an antitrust case,_) adopting the Rozelle Rule thereafter as 
_) Radovich v .  National Football League, 352, U . S .  445 ( 1 9 57 ) .
another mechanism to achieve the same economic effect . Recent ly the 
NFL was successfully challenged again, with the Rozelle Rule the focus 
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of the dispute ._) In the Kapp case, the judge found the NFL' s
_) Kapp v .  NFL, U . S . D . C .  Northern California, C-72-537 and 
Mackey v.  NFL, U . S .D . C .  Minnesota, C-4-72-277 .  Decisions about the 
legality of the Rozelle Rule were handed down in 1 97 5 ;  however the 
issue will not be resolved until the owners exhaust their 
opportunities for appeal . 
1 5  
player reservation system i n  violation of the antitrust statutes . The 
Mackey case involved thirty-two players who had played out their 
options . The court ruletl that the Rozelle Rule was an illegal 
collusive agreement to prevent competition for their services.  In 
hockey, the baseball-like reserve system was found illegal in a 1 973 
decision;-/ hockey has subsequently instituted the option system.
_I Philadelphia World Hockey vs.  Philadelphia Hockey, cited 
above. 
In basketball, Os car Robertson, acting in his capacity as President of 
the National Basketball Association Players' Association, filed an 
antitrust suit that challented the NBA' s counterpart to the Rozelle 
Rule . -
1 
Just before the case was to go to trial, it was settled out 
J Robertson, et al.  v .  NBA, et al . ,  U . S . D . C .  Southern
District of New York, 70 Civ . 1 526 . 
of court when the NBA agreed to abandon temporarily the compensation 
payment when a player signed with a new team and to make the future 
compensation system a mandatory bargaining issue with the players' 
association. Finally, over one hundred soccer players have launched 
an antitrust suit that seeks to ease the restrictiveness  of the player 
reservation system of both the North American Soccer League and the 
international governing body of soccer , the Federation Internationale 
de Football Association .J 
J Kerr, et al.  v. NASL, et al.,  U . S . D . C .  District of
Minnesota ,  Civil No . 4-78-56 0 .  
Even though baseball has succeeded in retaining i t s  antitrust 
exemption, the players nevertheless succeeded in obtaining what has 
proven to be the most  liberal system for allowing veterans to offer 
their services in a competitive market .  In a collective bargaining 
agreement signed in the early 1 970s , baseball agreed to have contract 
disputes between a player and his team settled by compulsory 
arbitration. Soon thereafter , two pitchers, Dave McNally and Andy 
Messersmith, allowed one full year to pass  without signing their 
contracts . They then asserted that they were free agents ,  arguing 
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that a team' s negotiating rights to a player were not permanent . The 
labor arbitrator who was assigned to resolve this contract dispute 
ruled that the players' interpretation of their contract s was valid , 
and declared them to be free agents .  Subsequent court challenges by 
the owners failed to overturn the decision. 
This ruling put the baseball players in a very strong 
bargaining position with the owners ,  and thereby led to the virtual 
decimation of baseball's  player reservation system for veteran 
player s .  The players' union and the owners subsequently negotiated 
the present system whereby six-year veterans can play out their 
options and become free agents .  
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The gains in the other sports from victories or settlements in 
antitrust actions have not been so dramatic . The Rozelle Rule system 
of compensation for the signing of free agents has succeeded in 
keeping down the number of free agents seeking to switch teams in all 
sports , as have the multiyear option periods in hockey and soccer . 
Player unions have succeeded in making the player reservation system a 
mandatory collective bargaining issue ,  so that the possibility of 
player strikes lies behind demands for greater competition in the 
player market .  And in the future as in the pas t ,  player unions are an 
effective vehicle for organizing and financing court challenges to 
league practice s .  Obviously, player unions have become a major force 
in sports , and their rise to power is a topic that requires further 
examination. 
Player Unions 
The recent wave of court cases attacking the player 
reservation system is due in large measure to the rise of player 
unions . In the mid-1960s ,  players in all sports except soccer began 
to build effective , militant players' associations . The soccer union 
began to develop a decade later. Although these organizations 
do not focus on the use of collective bargaining to establish 
individual salaries , _J in every other respect they seek the same 
_J The only wage issues normally included in collective 
bargaining in sports are the salary minimum for a major league 
athlete, the proportionality factor between a player' s option year 
salary and his salary in the prior year, and the maximum percentage 
reduction in salary a team can offer . 
obj ectives as other labor unions . Generally the unions have been 
active in seeking institutional changes within sports that improve the 
bargaining position of players in the salary negotiation proce s s .  
Antitrust attacks o n  the player reservation system have been financed 
by player associations,  notably the Flood, Mackey, Robertson, and Kerr 
cases mentioned above . In addition, player associations have sought, 
and in hockey and baseball have obtained , arbitration of salary 
disputes .  
In salary arbitration, a player and his team each make "final" 
salary offer s .  An arbitration board, selected by labor and 
management , then picks one or the other figure (but no other-- i . e . ,  
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they cannot set a salary other than one of the two proposed by the 
parties ) .  The arbitration board is instructed to make its decision on 
the basis of the earnings of other players of comparable ability and 
experience in the·sport ,  and not to consider the particular f inancial 
condition of either the player or his team. 
Salary arbitration does not eliminate monopsony in the player 
market ,  for as long as player s ,  on average ,  are paid a monopsony wage ,  
arbitration b y  a single player cannot lead t o  his procuring a 
competitive wage. But the structural impact of arbitration is still 
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important, since it eliminates the possibility of a team behaving as a 
discriminating monopolist . Each player can be said to have a 
"reservation salary" below which he will either retire from sport or 
give his team less than his full playing effor t .  With a monopsonized 
player market,  a team has the market power to pay the player only his 
reservation price in order to obtain his services . Consequently, two 
players of equal ability and experience but differing reservation 
prices could be paid different wages . An arbitration procedure,  with 
results based upon the average relation between pay and performance , 
provides a salary boost to a player whose  reservation price is low. 
A second accomplishment of player unions has been to obtain 
the right of players to be represented by agents .  In the past , teams 
refused to negotiate with anyone other than the player himself.  Now 
players can be represented by professional agents who are 
knowledgeable about the general pattern of salaries in sports and who 
are skilled negotiators . This ,  too , protects against teams who wish 
to use monopsony power and a player's weak bargaining skills to force 
a player's wage down to his reservation price. 
National Broadcasting Rights 
Rights to broadcast sports contests are sold in two m�rket s .  
In one , leagues sell t o  national networks the rights t o  national 
broadcasts , while in the other, individual teams sell the rights to 
games that are not broadcast nationally to broadcasters in the area 
around the team's home city . 
Two key institutional rules in professional sports  govern the 
structure of the broadcasting market .  The first i s  the granting t o  a 
team of exclusive control over broadcasts of any team in the same 
league within its home metropolitan areas . This prevents a team in 
one city from broadcasting its games into the home area of another 
team. 
The second major institutional arrangement in broadcasting is 
the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1 961 ,-1 which exempted leagues from
_} P . L .  87-331 ( 75 Stat . 732) . 
antitrust prosecution if they chose to sell national broadcasting 
rights on a league , rather than team, basi s .  The Sports Broadcasting 
Act was passed by Congress after a series of court cases had made 
sports broadcasting competitive . These decisions held illegal 
league-wide national broadcasting contract s ,  the league rule 
prohibiting radio broadcasts into another team' s territory , and the 
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rule prohibiting television broadcasts into the team's home city on 
days when the home team was not playing or playing in another city . 
All that the courts were willing to permit were blackouts of telecasts 
when the home team was at home�a practice overturned by Congress in 
1 974 for sell-out games . 
For a few years in the late 1 950s , national broadcasting 
rights were sold competitively. Four networks were formed to offer 
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professional football,  three involving NFL teams and one involving the 
AFL. Two competitive national broadcasts of major league baseball 
were offered twice weekly, one focusing primarily on the Yankees 
during their heyday but also involving four other teams , and another 
involving most,  but not all ,  of the remaining teams . 
Within a few years after the passage of the Sports 
Broadcasting Act , all national broadcasting contracts in sports were 
negotiated with league s .  In football,  the national contract has come 
to dominate telecasts : all NFL regular season and playoff game rights 
are now sold by the league to national networks . Only radio 
broadcasts and pre-season telecasts  are controlled by individual 
teams . In other sports,  though local rights are still important , fees 
from league sales of national rights have grown in importance . In 
baseball, for example,  national rights constituted les s than 20 
percent of total broadcast revenues in 1 95 5 .  By 1 970 , 47 percent of 
revenues from broadcasting came through national contracts ._} 
_} Ira Horowitz,  "Sports Broadcasting , "  in Roger G. Noll,  
editor , Government and the Sports Business ,  Brookings Institution, 
1 974, p .  287 . 
The switch from teams to leagues as the source of national 
contracts profoundly affected the structure of the national 
broadcasting rights market . Prior to that act , in each sport between 
six (hockey) and twenty-four ( football after the emergence of the AFL) 
teams were potential sellers of broadcasting rights . On the demand 
side, three large national networks plus a fourth loose federation of 
independent stations were potential buyer s .  After the Act was pas sed 
and subsequent mergers were completed, only one entity was selling 
rights in each sport , a potentially dominating position for the 
leagues when confronting even as tight an oligopoly as the national 
television networks . 
The financial consequences of the law were predictable : much 
greater broadcasting revenue for sports enterprises . The first 
broadcasting package negotiated by major league baseball  after the 
passage of the act, when all other national contracts had finally 
expired, went into effect in 1 965; it approximately tripled the 
national broadcasting revenues of the sport over the previous few 
year s ,  from $2 million to $6 million spread among twenty teams . In 
football,  the first league-wide contract negotiated by the NFL went 
into effect in 1 964.  It raised broadcasting revenue s per team from 
$383 ,000 to $1 , 061 ,000 .-1 Obviously, the antitrust exemption of the
_} Horowitz , pp . 287-288 . 
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league-wide package conferred an important monopoly advantage .  
Although the new contracts called for the broadcast o f  fewer games 
than had been telecast in prior year s ,  revenues jumped dramatically. 
Meanwhile,  local broadcasting revenues in baseball continued their 
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annual growth of about 8 percent per year�even though the number of 
games available for local broadcast had increased with the reduction 
in national telecasts from four per week to one . 
Another piece of evidence illustrating the monopoly power of 
sports leagues can be found in comparing the profitability of rights 
to broadcast sporting events with the profits of suppliers of other 
types of television programming . The bargaining power of suppliers of 
sports broadcasts can be compared to that of suppliers of conventional 
programs by examining the division of economic rents between 
broadcasters and both kinds of program suppliers . The economic rent 
is the difference between the advertising revenue of a program and the 
costs, including a competitive rate of profit, of producing and 
broadcasting the program. Given its cost structure, the maximum a 
network can pay for a sports broadcast and still earn a normal profit 
(a rate of return on inves tment of 12 percent after taxes )  is about 45 
percent of the advertising revenue generated by the program; leagues 
actually pay an average of 38 percent for national rights .  For 
regular series in prime time , the maximum the network could pay is 50 
percent of revenues; in fact , series average about 40 percent ._} 
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_J Roger G. Noll,  Merton J .  Peck and John J. McGowan , Economic 
Aspects of Television Regulation, Washington, D . C . : The Brookings 
Institution , 1 973 , Ch . 3 and Appendix B.  
Producers of series programming incur production costs  for  programs 
equal to about 3 2  percent of broadcasting revenues ,  so that 8 percent 
of revenues are rents for producers while 10 percent are rents for 
broadcasters . The co st to the sports enterprise of allowing its game 
to be telecast  is effectively nothing�that is , the entire rights fee 
is a net increment to revenue ._) Hence , about 
_j It is often alleged by sports entrepreneurs that the 
televising of games in the same area where that game or even another 
game is being played will hurt the gate at the latter . If so,  
broadcasts would have a cost to a team equal to the decline in net 
gate receipts that they caused. After analyzing the available data on 
this issue ,  Horowitz concludes : "On balance • 
• it is by no means 
obvious that, over an extended period of time, telecasts--even of home 
games on a selective basis--have hurt,  or would hurt,  gate receipts "  
( p .  286 ) . 
8 percent of revenues are rents for broadcaster s ,  while perhaps 30 
percent are rents for teams . Thus , sports enterprises,  by bargaining 
as a unit for national rights , essentially neutralize the tight 
television network oligopoly. They capture about 80 percent of the 
economic rent generated by the broadcast,  compared to the capture of 
less than half the rent by series producers .  
It i s  difficult to find a more clear-cut example of 
monopolistic rent than the revenues sports leagues receive from 
national broadcasting rights.  Furthermore, this monopoly rent owes 
its presence to explicit government action�the legalization through 
the Sports  Broadcasting Act of a cartel arrangement to sell 
broadcasting rights .  
Admissions, Concessions and Local Broadcasts 
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The market for admissions to home game s ,  including the 
conces sion sales that accompany admissions , is essentially a local 
one . The Baltimore Orioles once surveyed the fans attending their 
home games during a season, and found that approximately 75 percent 
lived within forty-five minutes' driving time of the stadium._) In an 
1 955 . 
_J Baltimore Baseball Club Survey: 1954, Baltimore Orioles , 
antitrust suit tried in 1 97 5 ,  the Oakland Raider s ,  San Francisco 49ers 
and Washington Redskins revealed that between 80 and 90 percent of 
their season tickets--which account for virtually all tickets sold for 
all three teams--were sold to residents of the metropolitan area in 
which the team played. _) Even out-of-town ticket sales are not 
_} Hecht v .  Pro-Football, Inc .,  U . S . D. C .  for District of 
Columbia, CA 2815-66 . 
necessarily transacted in a national or regional market, since 
visitors may be in a team' s city for reasons other than the desire to 
attend a game, or distant firms may acquire tickets to entertain 
clients in the team' s home city . 
Although the admissions market is primarily local , 
nevertheless teams in three sports have a substantial interest  in the 
home attendance of other teams . In baseball, football and soccer the 
visiting team is paid part of the gate, receiving between 10 and 20 
percent in baseball, 40 percent in football ,  and 25 percent in soccer . 
In all sports, the costs  of league operations are paid out of a fixed 
percentage assessment of gate receipts, so that the more successful 
teams pay a higher proportion of league costs  than do the weak 
franchises . As a result, league members have some interest in 
investigating the market potential of proposed locations of new or 
relocated teams . 
Part of the market for broadcasts of games is local or 
regional. While national telecasts  of selected games are offered in 
all four major sports,  in all but football the sale of rights for 
local and regional broadcasts  can be a more important source of 
revenue than the sale of national rights . In the early 1 970s in 
baseball, for example, teams received roughly $400 ,000 each as their 
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share of national broadcasting revenues ,  but averaged nearly 
$1 ,000 ,000 each from local broadcasts ( leagues capture another 
$450 ,000 per team from special events such as the All-Star game and 
World Series, but much of this goes to the players and their pension 
fund) . The Los Angeles Dodgers received $1 .8 million for local 
broadcasting rights, more than four times their share of national 
revenues . _}
_} Horowitz, p .  291 . 
In the admissions and local broadcasting markets, a team faces 
only a few competitors, and these usually offer imperfect substitutes 
for the team's product . Five out of six major league teams enjoy a 
local monopoly in their sport.  The remaining teams have only one 
competitor. In all sports either profes sional teams in the minor 
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leagues in the same sport,  pro teams in other sports or amateur 
teams--high school and college--create some additional competition . 
Of course, obvious differences in the quality of play and the focus of 
fan loyalties make amateur and minor league sports an imperfect 
competitor for the major leagues .  In addition, the amateurs and the 
pro s try to avoid temporal competition. Generally, the amateurs 
schedule most games on Fridays and Saturdays ,  while the pros 
concentrate more on Sunday and the middle of the week, a tactic 
intended to avoid competition for attendance at games ,  for 
broadcasting audience s ,  and between attendance at amateur contests and 
broadcast  audiences for the pro s .  
Competition among pro teams in different sports i s  minimized 
by the seasonality of each. While all sports overlap somewhat in 
their playing s chedules,_; only hockey and basketball are in direct 
_J At the league level ,  the decision to overlap seasons is 
conscious; presumably both major league baseball and the NFL could 
reduce the duration of their seasons by two weeks and produce a 
monopoly for each for part of September. That they choose  not to do 
so may reveal an inability to coordinate strategies , but more likely 
it reveals a relatively low degree of competition between the sports .  
competition during their entire seasons . 
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On the demand side , the number of people who attend games is a 
surprisingly small fraction of the population. The Baltimore Orioles 
survey found that in a year in which the Orioles drew over one million 
fans , fewer than 100 , 000 different people attended a game . In 
attendance at the typical game during the eighty home dates would be a 
few thousand season ticket holder s ,  a few thousand regular fans who 
attend several games a year , and only a few hundred individuals who 
attend a game once or twice a year. In football ,  where NFL teams draw 
about 400 ,000 fans during the regular season, nearly all seats are 
sold as season tickets , so that even taking account of the sharing of 
season tickets it is unlikely that more than 80 ,000 different 
individuals will attend a home game of most teams during a season. In 
hockey, basketball and soccer the numbers are even smaller. These 
teams average 5 ,000 to 20 ,000 per game in attendance , with between 
half and all of the attendance accounted for by season tickets . Since 
most metropolitan areas that contain major league teams range in 
population from two to six million, it follows that for most teams 
only a few percent of the residents of its home city ever attend a 
professional game . 
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Such is not the case when it comes to sports broadcasts . In 
most citie s ,  a single radio or television broadcast of a game will 
reach more people than will attend the game in person in an entire 
season. And here audience shares,  particularly of telecasts , are 
sufficiently large that simultaneous broadcasts by two teams in 
different sports would directly compete in that each would have a 
significantly smaller audience than if the broadcasts were not 
simultaneous . Consequently, teams and leagues try to avoid 
simultaneous broadcasts . Scheduling differences and the effects of 
the division of the nation into time zones mean that teams located in 
the same city , whether in the same or different sports,  usually do not 
play at exactly the same time . 
Structural Spillovers from Sports Broadcasting 
The demand side of the market for broadcasting rights as seen 
by a team or league is not the broadcasting audience , but radio and 
television stations and advertisers . In most cities , numerous radio 
stations make the market for radio rights competitive ; however , few 
cities have more than a handful of television stations , and no city 
has more than a few VHF stations . For various technical reasons, a 
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program will draw about twice as large an audience on a VHF station as 
it will on a UHF station. Since the advertising revenue captured by a 
broadcast is proportional to the size of its audience, a VHF station 
can always outbid a UHF station if it chooses to enter the competition 
for broadcasting rights . 
Advertisers of both national and local sports broadcasts are 
usually large firms in oligopolistic industries in which nonprice 
competition can confer market advantages.  The majority of maj or 
league games, national and local, are sponsored by a brewery, an oil 
company, a firm in banking and f inance, and an automobile company . 
Prior to the ban on cigarette advertising, a majority of teams were 
sponsored by a tobacco manufacturer as wel l .  Other industries with 
firms that sponsor broadcasts are soft drinks, insurance, airlines, 
tires, cosmetics and shaving products ._) 
_J Horowitz, pp . 3 12 ,  316 . 
Two aspects of sports sponsorship are important . First, 
although sponsors tend to be large, oligopolistic f irms, the number of 
industries from which they are drawn is sufficiently large that the 
demand side of the advertising market is competitive. Second, to the 
extent that sports advertising is a unique product, in a g iven sport 
the local monopoly enjoyed by a team and the national monopoly 
possessed by a league confer a competitive advantage on a single 
advertiser. For example, when the New York Mets were organized, their 
broadcasting rights were sold to the brewers of Rheingold beer. In 
the next few years sales of Rheingold in the New York market overtook 
and passed sales of Ballantine, the sponsors of the then-fading 
Yankees ._) 
_J Horowitz, p .315 . 
The benefits of this kind of market boost  are not necessarily 
to the sponsors of sports broadcasts . The team or league, being one 
of a few sources of sports broadcasts, is in a position to capture 
most of the benefits advertising confers on the sponsor and the 
broadcaster, especially the radio broadcaster, since radio, too, is 
competitive . A VHF television station or a national network, being 
one of a few pos sible outlets for televised sports, is also in a 
po sition to capture some of these benef its .  
Facilities 
The market for facilities in which to stage contests is also 
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local, although less so for a team than for the owner of a facility 
(usually a local government ) .  Obviously, a stadium or arena cannot be 
moved to another city ; a team, however, has some freedom to move, and 
hence competition among facilities for a team is a possibility . 
Although facilities available for sports have other uses, few are 
fully utilized--especially the stadiums used for football and 
baseball. As a result, even if the local market for a facility is a 
bilateral monopoly, the balance of bargaining strength favors the 
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team. On several occasions teams have moved, or used the threat of 
moving, as a device for obtaining better rental bargains . For 
instance, after losing the Braves to Atlanta, Milwaukee County Stadium 
attracted the then-Pilots, now Brewers, from Seattle by offering to 
charge only $1 annual rent for the first million admissions sold. 
S imilarly, RFK S tadium in Washington, D . C .  tried to keep the Senators 
baseball team, and later to attract the San Diego Padres, by offering 
attractive rental agreements .  
The consequence of intercity competition for baseball and 
football teams is that nearly all stadiums lose  money. During the 
1 970-7 1 season, twenty publicly-owned baseball and football stadiums 
for which financial information was publicly available lost  a total of 
over $8 million, with most of the loss accounted for by the stadiums 
built in the ten years immediately preceding the survey._) This is a 
_J Benjamin A. Okner, "Subsidies of Stadiums and Arenas, "  in 
Noll, Government and the Sports Business .  
predictable result, given the structure o f  costs o f  a sports facility . 
Most  of the costs of a stadium, once it has been built, are fixed . 
Regardless of the extent of use of the facility, interest on bonds 
must be paid and maintenance of the field and seats must be continued 
at some minimum level .  As long as there are more facilities than 
teams to play in them, competition among stadium authorities will 
force rents down to the point at which they cover only the costs  of 
staging contes t s .  Operators of facilities owned by local governments 
may be willing to accept even lower rents, since they will consider 
the effect on tax revenues of keeping a team in the city in 
calculating the minimum rent they are willing to accept . 
Barriers to Entry 
In principle, two kinds of competitive entry into sports are 
possible.  A local monopoly could be broken by the entry of new teams, 
and a national monopoly enjoyed by a league could be eroded by the 
formation of new league s .  The latter could lead t o  entry in local 
monopolies if new leagues choose to locate in the home towns of 
established teams . 
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In practice , with few exceptions entry has taken place only in 
the form of competitive leagues, for league rules prevent most  forms 
of competition among their members . With two major exceptions, 
expansion franchises in a major league have never constituted 
economically meaningful entry : they normally have been located in 
cities previously lacking a member of the expanding league, and the 
teams have participated in the broadcasting and player policies that 
preclude interteam competition in those market s .  To illustrate why 
entry must  be through new leagues, we will begin by examining the 
barriers to entry in a particular locality. 
The presence of local monopoly in admissions, local broadcasts 
and facilities has two possible causes . First, the monopoly may be 
natural in that only one or two teams in a particular sport are 
economically viable, given the co st and demand conditions in the 
market .  Second, institutional barriers may preclude entry. 
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The previous analysis of the various sports markets surely 
suggests that institutional barriers are important . Membership in a 
league confers upon a team "territorial rights . "  The details differ 
from sport to sport, but the effect of these rights in all cases is to 
protect a member against facing direct competition in its home city. 
No other team in the league is permitted to s chedule games or 
broadcasts of games in another league member's home city without the 
approval of the home team. 
These rules do not totally rule out the entry of a second team 
into a city. The Los Angeles Dodgers, for example, were paid an 
indemnity by the California Angels when the American League placed the 
Angels in the Dodgers' home territory. And when the NFL and the 
American Football League merged, the San Francisco 49ers and the New 
York Giants were indemnified for granting NFL membership to their 
competing AFL teams, the Oakland Raiders and the New York Jets . 
Furthermore, new competitors can be introduced when a new league is 
formed without approval from or compensation to established teams in 
other league s .
The territorial rights do, however, constitute a potential 
barrier to entry for several reasons . First, since a home team must 
give its approval if its market is to be shared, the costs of entry 
are increased by the requirement that the established team's 
acquiescence be purchased. Second, territorial rights in broadcasting 
reduce the potential revenue of other teams by denying them the 
possibility of selling broadcasting rights in the territory of another 
team, such as selling rights to broadcast a home game in the visiting 
team's home town. 
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In 1 980, territorial rights were placed in j eopardy by the 
attempt of the Oakland Raiders of the National Football League to move 
to Los Angeles.  The Raiders announced the move without first seeking 
league approval.  When the other owners and the league commis s ioner 
expressed disapproval, the matter moved to the courts, where 
resolution of the issue is pending at this writing . The Raiders and 
their potential new landlords, the Los Angeles Coliseum Commission, 
claim that league rules inhibiting the transfer of the franchise are 
an antitrust violation. On purely economic grounds, their claim has 
merit, for surely if the San Francisco metropolitan area can support 
two football teams, so can the much more populous Los Angeles area . 
Entry even into markets with no major league team can be 
forestalled by a monopolistic league . Each league has a set of formal 
procedures for deciding whether a new team will be admitted. One 
requirement is that a very large majority of existing league members 
( typically three-fourths ) agree to admit another team. Another is a 
similar vote among the membership to determine the price of entrance . 
In all cases  the price is expressed as a franchise fee, 
usually small, plus another price at which existing teams will sell 
the newcomer the rights to certain veteran players, usual ly the 
players that rank in the bottom half or third in terms of playing 
ability. The league will also require that the new entrant buy a 
36 
certain number of players from each member. The reasons for this 
rather complicated mechanism for establishing new teams are,  for the 
most part,  derived from the tax laws . According to past Internal 
Revenue Service practice , a team can deduct as a depreciation expense 
the amount spent on players ,  but not the amount paid for a franchise, 
during the few years after the team is purchased. These noncash 
depreciation expenses can be deducted from other income to determine 
income tax liability . The ultimate effect of this tax treatment is 
that the federal government ends up paying for 50 to 70 percent of the 
cost of a team through reductions in the tax liability of team 
owners ._) 
_J For more details ,  see Benjamin A. Okner, "Taxation and 
Sports Enterprises , "  in Nol l ,  Government and the Sports Business ,  Ch . 6 .
In addition, leagues are usually organized as nonprofit 
entities , which are not allowed to pay dividends to their owners, the 
teams . In order to maintain their nonprofit status the expansion 
revenues must  go directly to the teams in the league , and not pass 
through the league . Even if leagues were for-profit corporations , 
payments directly to teams avoid the income taxation that would be 
levied on a league if it received expansion payments which were then 
divided among the members as dividends . 
League rules for creating new teams guarantee that nearly all 
members must be satisfied with the terms on which an expansion 
franchise is granted, and thereby enable the league to behave as a 
monopolist in selling membership . Without the near-unanimity 
requirement , in a year in which several teams faced severe economic 
hardship a league might sacrifice long-term profit maximization and 
vote for the admis sion of several new teams in order to raise capital . 
The pos sibility of this happening , however , is lower if the number of 
teams that must  acquiesce to it is greater. 
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Monopolization of expansion franchise s ,  like any other 
monopoly, leads to a slower rate of expansion at a higher price per 
franchise than is warranted by market conditions . It also serves to 
maintain high prices for existing teams . Thus , some viable markets 
can be expected to be without franchises .  Nevertheles s ,  the extent to 
which leagues can husband franchises to maximize financial gain is 
limited by the threat that a competitive league can be formed. 
The pos sibility of a new league being organized is not a tight 
check on the monopolistic position of teams and leagues .  Firs t ,  the 
formation of a successful new league is possible only if several 
cities possess an excess demand for a particular professional sport.  
If  the number of such cities is too few to constitute an entire 
league , permanent monopoly rents can accrue to teams in markets  big 
enough for a new entrant to succeed and to all members of a league 
from slow expansion at high franchise prices . Second, if a league can 
enforce its player reservation system against a new league , the 
entrant does not have access to established major league stars . As a 
result , the start-up costs associated with attaining major league 
status in the eyes of the sports fan are increased, for the league 
must develop its own stars from among the ranks of amateurs and minor 
league professionals . 
When baseball had a perpetual reserve clause ,  it succeeded in 
enforcing it against new entrants,  so that new baseball leagues could 
not hire any player who was playing pro ball at any level when the 
league formed as long as the established leagues wanted to retain him. 
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All other sports have succeeded in requiring new entrants to honor the 
clause in player contracts requiring an option year before the player 
can change teams , although a team in the new league need not 
compensate the old for signing players who have played out their 
option. For example, the Memphis team in the World Football League 
succeeded in signing three star players from the Miami NFL team, but 
obtained their services only after they had played out their options 
with Miami . 
A final institutional mechanism that has been deployed to 
forestall entry is the exclusive rental agreement to obtain a stadium. 
One of the original owners of a World Football  League franchise wanted 
to locate his franchise in Washington, D . C . , where the NFL Redskins 
play to full capacity and have a waiting list several thousand long to 
obtain season tickets . This team eventually settled in Florida 
because it was unable to secure an adequate playing facility in the 
Washington area. Only two sta-Oiums large enough to accommodate a 
major league football team are located in the Washington metropolitan 
area : RFK Stadium, the home of the Redskins , and the University of 
Maryland stadium. The latter is unavailable for professional 
contest s ,  and the former, by agreement with the Redskins , is available 
for professional football only if the Redskins approve . 
In 1 966 , an antitrust suit was filed in an attempt to break 
the exclusive lease between the Redskins and the operators of the 
stadium._) The purpose was to permit the holder of the D . C .  franchise 
_J Hecht v. Pro-Football,  Inc . 
in the AFL to locate his team in Washington. The defendants were the 
Redskins , the NFL, and the D . C .  Armory Board , the operator of RFK 
Stadium. The initial decision in the case was that the lease was not 
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an antitrust violation, but the appeals court ruled that the judge had 
made reversible errors and ordered a retrial . Before the retrial 
began, the NFL settled the case out of court by offering the plaintiff 
a large amount of cash on the condition that the amount not be 
revealed. Thus , the antitrust status of exclusive leases on stadiums 
remains unresolved. 
Because stadiums generally lose money , a new entrant faces a 
significant absolute cost barrier if it must construct its own playing 
facility . Only if a local government authority is willing to build a 
second money-losing facility�in spite of exces s  capacity in the 
first--can this barrier be eliminated when the incumbent team has an 
exclusive lease . Presumably the political demand to obtain a second 
team in a sport--particularly in a new , untried league--is likely to 
be less than the desirability to voters of attracting the first maj or 
league team. To build a facility requires either the passage of a 
bond issue or the election of politicians willing to commit taxes to 
guarantee that the expenses of constructing a stadium will be paid. 
Since only a small proportion of voters actually attend game s ,  the 
source of majority-rule approval of financing these money-losing 
ventures must  lie in the presumed benefits to a city of acquiring 
''major league" status ._) This perceived benefit is not available 
_J For a discussion of these benef its ,  see Okner. 
as an argument for obtaining a second team, which makes it more 
difficult to obtain political approval of additional facilitie s .  
I s  the Sports Monopoly Natural? 
The preceding discussion leads to the conclusion that 
institutional impediments could foreclose economically warranted 
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entry . Whether entry is foreclosed depends upon an assessment of co st 
and demand conditions in sports , and , in particular , examination of 
the possibility that teams are natural monopolies. 
The precise definition of natural monopoly is more complicated 
than is needed for the purposes of this chapter ; suffice to say that a 
monopoly is natural if indivisibilities in the production proces s make 
it impossible for more than one firm to earn nonnegative profits in a 
market .  
In sports ,  the production function describing the "technology" 
of operating a sports franchise has definite indivisibilities . League 
rules , which no individual team can change, dictate the minimum number 
of players a team can field and the number of games per season a team 
must play. Furthermore, because a team must  be reasonably competitive 
athletically to generate fan interest, the general playing quality of 
a league determines a minimum feasible quality for each team. 
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Finally,  a league member is committed to pay the costs  associated with 
transporting team members to other cities to play away games . Failure 
to satisfy any of these minimum requirements for league membership-­
including the requirement to field a respectable team--will cause a 
team to be expelled from the league . 
In the short run, the minimum expenditure commitment of a team 
is a very high percentage of its total costs . Table 1 shows 
approximate co sts of teams in the major sports,  broken down by 
expenditure categories , for the early 1 970s ._) League rules require 
_J No comprehensive data have been assembled since; however , 
revenues in 1980 probably were at least double those shown in the 
table , and player costs  were probably three times as high. In soccer , 
revenues average about a half-mil lion dollars per team, player 
salaries average a very low $10 ,000 , and most  teams lose money, but no 
more than a few hundred thousand dollars a year. 
that a player receive his full contractual salary if he is not 
released from the team before a relatively early date in the playing 
season, so that in the short run player co sts are fixed. Over the 
TABLE 1 
Income Statements of Average Teams by League 
(figu re s in thousand of dollar s ) 
Le a gue NBA NFL MLB NHL 
Y e a r  1 9 71 1 9 70 1 96 9 1 9 73
Ope rating Revenue s I ,  760 4, 850 5 ,  225 4, 1 5 0
Game s l ,  zoo Z, 700 3, ZOO 3 , 450
B road c a s t s  360 1 , 850 1 ,  420 550
Othe r zoo 300 605 1 50 
D i r e c t  C o s t s  l ,  8 1 5 3 ,  350 4, 955 Z, 750
Playe r Compe n s ation 700 Z, 000 l ,  070 1 ,  000
Gam e s  600 950 1 ,  1 90 I ,  350
Gene ral and Administrative 340 350 } 1 ,  375 ZZ5P r omotion 1 75 50 75
Playe r Development 0 0 1 ,  320 1 00 
Op e r ating P r ofit -55 1 , 500 Z70 l ,  400
Othe r  Inc on1e 55 zoo n ,  a ,  100
Cash Flow 0 1 ,  700 Z70 l, 500
Indi r e c t  Co�ts 435 600 445 500 
Play e r  Amortization 3 70 500 445 500
Int e r e s t  65 1 00 n. a . n. a .  
Book P r ofit Before Taxe s -435 1, 1 0 0 - 1 75 1 , 000
Benefi t  of Owne r s hip Aft e r  Taxe s Z l 7 l ,  1 5 0 357 1 , 000
n. a .  = no basis f o r  e s timate 
Sou r ce : Summarie s of table s in Roger G, Noll, "The U. S.  Te am Sports Industry:  An Introduction, " in Roge r G. Noll
( e d . ) .  Gove rnment and the Sports Busine s s ,  B r ookings institution: W a s hin gton, D. C. , 1 9 74. De tails of e s timat e s
a n d  s o ur c e s  o f  information a re p r e s e nted in the s e  table s ,  
Not e :  Except for the l a s t  l i n e ,  figure s are e s timate s of teams of ave rage quality for E' a ch league.  E a ch league h a s  
a fe w te a1ns that do m u c h  bette r a n d  a few t h a t  do much w o r s e  financially than the se a v e r a ge s show. T h e  " B e nefit o f  
Owne r ship" calcufations a s s ur'e s that the owne r o f  t h e  team is i n  t h e  50% m a rginal t a x  bracket for fe de r al income tax 
a n d  that he h a s  sufficient othe r incom e to take advantage of the tax w rite - off po s s ib i l itie s of any book loss the team mi ght 
e xpe rine c e ,  Most owne r s  a re p r obably s ufficiently wea lthy that the i r  marginal tax rate is at least 50"/o, 
Definition s :  Playe r compe n s ation indude s wa�e s ,  fringe benefits and the p r e s e nt value of d e fe r red sala rie s for p l a ye r s ,  
coa che s and mana ge r s .  Game c o s t s  include r e n t s ,  maintenance of plaving fie ld ,  eq uipment, training c a mp s ,  travel and 
other expe n s e s  a s s oc iated with staging conte s t s ,  Player deve l opment refe r s  to s ubsidies of amat e u r  and minor p r ofo s ­
alonal l e ague s ,  
League Key : NBA, National Basketball Association; NFL, National Football 
League ; MLB, Major League Baseball ; NHL , National Hockey League , 
course of a few years , salary costs can be reduced somewhat ,  but the 
requirement that a representative team be fielded places limits on 
this . Within a league, the teams with the biggest  salary expenditures 
will spend between two and thee times as much as the teams with the 
lowest  salaries; hence it is unlikely that any team could cut its 
salary budget below half of the league-wide average.  
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Of the remaining cos t s ,  only rent on a stadium and payments to 
the league to pay common expense s ,  such as referees and umpires ,  are 
typically based on revenues and therefore not subject to minimum 
bounds . Rents vary from 5 to 20 percent of revenues for all but a few 
teams , and league payments are another 5 to 10 percent . Together 
these rarely total more than 25 percent of costs .  Consequently, on  a 
year-to-year basis 75 percent , and in the long run more than half,  of 
the expenditures of a team represent minimum, indivisible commitments 
required to continue in business .  
To determine whether co st indivisibilities in sports are 
sufficient to cause natural monopoly requires two additional pieces of 
analysis.  Tbe first is to calculate the minimum profit a team must 
earn in order to stay in business  in the long run. Tbe second is to 
examine the demand conditions in each sport to determine how many 
teams are viable in each market .  
Determining "normal prof its" in sports i s  horrendously 
complicated because of the extremely labor-intensive production method 
in the industry . Tbe typical balance sheet of a sports enterprise 
lists almost  no tangible capital investments ,  nor are its net assets 
likely to be even close to a reasonable approximation of the sales 
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value of the enterprise. Consider the financial statement of the 
Milwaukee Bucks basketball team for 1 97 0  ( Table 2 ) .  Tbe entire 
investment of the team in tangible,  physical capital is $21 ,000 in 
furniture and f ixtures , ignoring whatever may be the investment in the 
subsidiary (a summer camp) . Tbe items listed as "NBA Contracts" on 
the asset side of the ledger are payments due from expansion teams as 
part of the fee for j oining the league; on the liability side these 
are payments  due other teams for the expansion that granted the Bucks 
a franchise.  Entries relating to employment contracts represent a 
bookkeeping practice by the team to capture certain tax advantage s .  
I f  a player i s  signed t o  a multiyear contract that calls for part of 
his salary to be deferred, the team can deduct the deferred payment at 
the time the obligation is accrued if the team "funds"  the deferred 
payment . What this means is that if a player , as part of his contract 
for this year , is to be paid $10,000 twenty years from now, a team 
that invests the $10,000 in certain low-risk investments can deduct 
the deferred payment this year in computing its tax liabilities and, 
meanwhile,  earn the interest payments on the investment . 
Another major asset of the team is termed "Original Player 
Cost s . "  This represents the current value of the player contracts 
purchased by the Bucks during the expansion in which they obtained 
their franchise . Once again, this reflect s an accounting practice 
designed to take advantage of the tax ruling that enables a team to 
depreciate the cost of a player contract over the expected playing 
career of a player , which is normally taken to be five year s .  In 
197 0 ,  the Bucks claimed about $27 0 ,000 in player depreciation, which , 
TABLE 2 
MILWAUKEE BUCKS BALANCE SHEET 
Cu r r e nt As s e ts 
Cash, Inve s tme nt s ,  Accounts Re c e ivable and 
P repaid Expe nse s 
Cur rent Matudtie s of NBA Contracts Re ce ivable 
De fe r r e d  Costs of Employment Cont r acts 
T otal Cu r r e nt 
L ong Te rm As s e t s  
N B A  C ontracts Re ce ivable 
Defe r r e d  Costs of Employment C ont r a ct s  
Furniture and Fixtur e s  
Original Playe r C o s t s  
Sub s idiary A s s e t s  
Ce rtificate s o f  Dep o s it 
Cur r e nt Liabilitie s 
NBA C ontract Payable 
T otal Long - T e rm 
T otal As s e t s  
Ac c ounts Payable , Ac c r ue d Liabilitie s  and 
Advance Re venue s 
Employment Cont racts Payable 
T otal Cur r e nt 
L ong Te rm Liabilitie s 
NBA C ont ract Payabie 
Employment Cont r acts P ayable 
Defe r re d  Taxe s 
Shar e holde r s '  Equity 
T ot a l  Long - Te rm 
T otal Liabilitie s  
T otal Liabilitie s and Equity 
$2, 389 , 356  
1 1 7, 857  
644, 700 
$3 , 1 5 1 , 9 1 3  
$ 3 5 3, 572 
1 , 2 1 6 , 667  
2 1 , 0 1 4  
885 ,  1 24 
1 8 ,  523  
750 , 000 
$3 , 244, 900 
$6 ,  396,  8 1 3  
$ 2 50, 000 
1 ,  069 ,  938 
5 14, 989  
$ 1 , 834, 927  
$ 2 50, 000 
1 ,  345,  833 
1 37, 000 
$ 1 , 732 , 833  
$3 , 5 6 7, 760  
$2, 829, 053  
$6 , 396 , 8 1 3  
Sour ce :  Milwaukee P r ofe s s i onal Sp orts and Se rvi ce s ,  Inc. , 1 9 7 0  
Annual Report. 
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given corporate income taxes of about SO percent , reduced their income 
tax liability �y about $13S ,OOO . 
The importance of player depreciation on after-tax prof its can 
be seen by analyzing the income statement of the San Diego Padres , one 
of the less successful baseball franchises.  Table 3 shows the 
principal sources of revenues and cash expenses for the Padres . 
According to these figures,  the Padres lost about $SOO ,OOO in 1 97 9 .  
But this does  not take account of the write-off o f  the portion of the 
original purchase price of the Padres that was allocated to player 
contract s .  Although this amount is not known precisely, if the Padres 
followed practices common in sports the annual amount of player 
depreciation claimed would be at least $1 ,000 ,000 . Thus , the book 
loss of the Padres would be $1 ,S00 ,000 , which could then be deducted 
from the personal income tax returns of the owner s ,  in this case Ray 
Kroc ,  who also owns the MacDonald' s chain of fast-food restaurants .  
Assuming that the marginal tax rate o f  the Kroc family i s  SO percent , 
then ownership of the Padres reduced their tax liabilities by 
$750 ,000 , converting the $500 , 000 cash-flow loss  into a $250 ,000 
after-tax cash prof it . 
The original investment in player contracts is not really an 
investment in particular players ; it is the purchase from the other 
teams of the right to have exclusive bargaining rights,  through the 
player reservation system, with a proportionate share of the athletes 
in the sport.  The particular athletes drafted by the team from other 
rosters as part of the league expansion are simply the first group 
whose athletic career is the exclusive property of the expansion team. 
TABLE 3 
SAN DIEGO PADRES INCOME STATEMENT FOR 1979 
Revenues 
Gate Receipts 
Local Broadcasting 
Concessions 
National Broadcasting Share 
Other Misc .  
Total 
Expenses 
Team Salaries 
Other Team Expenses 
Stadium Rent and Maintenance 
Scouting 
Minor League Subsidy 
Promotion 
General and Adminis trative 
Other Misc .  
Total 
Total 
$5 ,560 , 000 
824 , 000 
842 , 000 
653 , 000 
232 , 000 
$8 , 111, 000 
$ 2 , 7 98 , 000 
1 , 290 , 000 
827 , 000 
411 , 000 
914 , 000 
360, 000 
837 , 000 
1 , 144, 000 
$8 , 581 , 000 
Source :  Los Angeles Times , March 1, 1980, p .  III-7 .
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In time, they are replaced by other players through trades and 
acquisitions from the rookie free agent draf t s .  The asset that 
creates value in these  contracts is not the contract itself, but the 
rules limiting competition among teams . These assets guarantee that 
competition for player s ,  for broadcasting revenues ,  for home gate 
receipts , and for a place in which to play will not erode the profit 
earned from the player. And the assets that generate this profit--the 
restrictive rules in the league-have essentially a zero "cost of 
production. "  These anticompetitive agreements among teams constitute 
essentially all of the assets of every team in professional sports 
except the few that own their own playing facilitie s .  
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The question thus arise s ,  what , if anything , is the true 
investment of society' s scarce resources in a sports franchise? For 
one thing , an owner agrees to operate a team for a year , which means 
that some expenditures are made before any revenues accrue . The owner 
assumes the risk that revenues will be insufficient to cover these 
c01ID11itments; therefore some profit must be expected by the owner to 
induce him to take this risk. In addition, a new team must undertake 
certain promotional expenditures to generate fan interes t .  These 
costs , plus minimal investments in playing equipment , represent the 
team' s only true investments in the sense of commitments of society' s 
scarce resources . For most teams these costs will sum to no more than 
a few hundred thousand dollar s ,  which implies that "normal" profits-­
those necessary to induce teams into the industry if cartel rights did 
not have to be purchased--are probably substantially les s than 
$100 ,000 annually .  All of the profits in excess of a few tens of 
thousands of dollars represent earnings created by monopoly rights .  
Judging from the bottom line of Table 1 and by the analysis of the 
Padres , most  teams exceed "normal" profits , and in some cases by a 
very large amount . 
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One task remains in determining whether these monopoly profits 
signal excess  demand for sports.  That is to examine the demand for 
sports to see whether entry would leave teams with sufficient revenues 
to cover costs . 
The demand for sports  in a particular city depends upon normal 
economic factors-price and income-plus the quality of the team, the 
quality and ease of access  of the facility in which it play s ,  and the 
alternatives available in the city for entertainment and recreation. 
Large cities have more people from which a team can generate an 
audience , but they are also more congested and have more entertainment 
alternatives . On balance , these effects produce a positive effect of 
population on attendance , holding other things constant , although a 
doubling of population will lead to less than a doubling of 
attendance . 
Similarly, because of differences in teams and their playing 
s chedules , the attendance generated by two teams will exceed the 
attendance either one would capture, holding ticket prices f ixed , if 
it had no competitor. Multiple teams increase the number of days on 
which a game is available and reduce the congestion at a given game by 
lowering average attendance . In addition, if teams play in different 
locations , they reduce the average distance of area residents to the 
nearest source of games .  For these reasons a second team will cause 
some net addition to total attendance in its sport . 
Statistical analysis of attendance at sports contests provides 
a rough estimate of the minimum population in a metropol itan area that 
can sustain a major league team in each professional sport,  assuming 
that a team is viable as long as it makes positive profits . These 
minimum populations are shown in Table 4 .  They represent the size of 
city required for break-even operation of a team, neglecting any tax 
benefits that might be captured from the depreciation of player 
contracts.  These figures are somewhat conservative , for they are 
based on data from the early 1 97 0s .  Because o f  growth in income , 
broadcasting revenue s ,  and other thing s ,  the demand for sports is 
greater in the 1 980s than it was a decade earlier . 
Since few teams compete against other teams in the same sport 
in the same city , direct statistical analysis of the effects of such 
competition on the minimum population required for multiple teams is 
not feasible. The table contains one rough approximation that is 
consistent with what is known about existing teams . For example, two 
financially successful professional football teams have operated in 
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the San Francisco-Oakland metropolitan area, which had a population of 
approximately 3 .1 million in 1 97 0 .  Two successful hockey franchises 
were located in the Boston metropolitan area in 1 972-73 , although one 
had great difficulty scheduling games in the arenas owned by the 
other . The Boston metropolitan area had a population of 2 .8 million
in 1 970.  In  New York, with a population of nearly twelve million, two 
extremely succes sful franchises operate in all sports except soccer, 
with at least one in each sport earning profits as great as any team 
SEort 
TABLE 4 
MINIMUM SIZE METROPOLITAN AREA FOR SUCCESSFUL TEAM 
(population in millions) 
Years 1 Team 2 Teams* 3 Teams* 
Baseball 1970-71 1 . 9  3 . 4  4 . 9  
Basketball 1969-71 4 . 0  7 . 6  10 . 7  
Football 1968 1 . 0  3 . 1  5 . 4  
Hockey 1972-73 . 9  2 . 6  5 . 6  
* 
Assumes that half of attendance of s econd team and two-thirds of 
attendance of third team are captured from competitors in the same 
sport , and that teams are of average quality, making playoffs in 
basketball and hockey about half the time . Based on early 1970s data . 
Source :  Calculated from statistical analysis of the demand for 
attendance at sports contests in Roger G. Noll , "Attendance 
and Price Setting , "  in Nol l ,  Government and the SEorts 
Business,  Ch. 4 .  
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in its sport.  In baseball,  two teams operate in Chicago,  one of which 
is very successful while the other is marginal . Two teams that 
apparently suffer losses operate in the San Francisco-Oakland area. 
According to the table , the Bay area is about 10 percent too small to 
be able to support its baseball teams . This , coupled with its cold 
swmner weather , probably makes it economically unviable as a location 
for two baseball teams , which seems to be borne out by the performance 
of the Athletics and the Giants in the 1 97 0 s .  
The preceding leads t o  the conclusion that the territorial 
rights of teams do foreclo se warranted entry in the largest cities ,  
but that in  the smallest cities in  each league a team is a natural 
monopoly in that only one is viable. In baseball , for example , cities 
such as Atlanta, Kansas City, Milwaukee ,  and San Diego may not be 
viable locations for one baseball team, let alone two ,  while cities 
such as Cincinnati,  Houston and Minneapolis probably can support one , 
but not two , teams . Nevertheless , the largest cities have too few 
teams . Chicago , Los Angeles and New York appear to be large enough 
for a third baseball team, and Philadelphia and Detroit for a second . 
Similar findings apply to other sports : most current franchise cities 
are natural monopolies , but the largest could support more teams . 
And , in football and hockey, a few cities now lacking teams are 
apparently large enough to support one . 
These findings are ,  of course, crucially dependent upon the 
existence of the monopolistic market positions enjoyed by league 
members.  Of the calculations shown in Table 4 ,  only tho se for 
basketball were based upon a situation in which two established 
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leagues competed for player s ,  and the minimum city s izes for viable 
operations are much larger for basketball  than for the others.  Had 
basketball salaries not accelerated due to competition between the ARA 
and NBA, each team would have paid, on average,  about $400 ,000 less 
per year in salaries during the 1 970s . This would reduce the minimum 
metropolitan area population for one viable team to under two million. 
On the other hand , player salaries also reflect monopolistic 
territorial franchises.  If New York, for example,  has only two 
football teams , the value of a star player will be greater than if it 
has more teams , for more teams , in spreading attendance among more 
competitor s ,  will reduce the number of fans--and hence the gate 
receipts�generated by a single star. Thus if players are paid their 
marginal revenue product , more competition in large cities could 
reduce player salaries in the same way that it reduces monopoly rent s .  
This reduction in costs  reduces the revenue necessary t o  make a team 
financially viable, so that the prospects for multiple teams in a city 
are somewhat better than indicated in Table 4.  
The results in  Table 4 also depend upon the gate sharing 
arrangement of the league . In baseball and football the visiting team 
receives part of the gate.  As a result , teams in smal ler markets are 
more likely to be economically viable. Teams from small markets 
receive more from the games they play in the best markets than they 
pay from home game receipts to teams from those markets.  Were 
baseball to raise the visiting team share from the current 10 percent 
(National League ) or 20 percent (American League ) to the 40 percent 
paid in football ,  the minimum population for a financially successful 
first team would fall to about 1 .3 million, assuring that all cities 
that now have teams would be viable.  
so
The main conclusion to be drawn from the financial analysis of 
major league sports  is that the market structure of the industry is 
highly dependent upon the league rules  regulating the sharing of 
revenue , the business  competition among members and the expansion of 
the league . While some teams are natural monopolies, others are not . 
'While all teams benefit from anticompetitive league rules , the biggest 
beneficiaries are the teams in the largest cities which earn monopoly 
profit s ,  because of the entry barriers created by league rules . 
CONDUCT AND PERFORMANCE 
Economists have long debated the appropriateness  of the 
conventional assumption that businessmen seek to maximize profit s .  In 
sports , the issue is of central importance , since the effect and 
desirability of prohibitions against competition depend critically on 
the motivation of team owners .  The major justification offered by 
sports entrepeneurs for the player reservation system is that it 
prevents a single team from so monopolizing playing talent that it 
destroys fan interest in the game and , thereby, causes massive 
financial failure in the league . 
This argument is valid only if the primary motivation of team 
owners is the unconstrained maximization of games won. If so,  the 
owner with the greatest financial strength--probably the owner in the 
best market--will  continue to acquire players until his team is sure to 
win all of its games .  The resulting lopsided contests will prove 
uninteresting to fans , espcially in other cities , and every team-­
including the certain victor�will  fail financially . 
If owners seek only victory, the player reservation system 
does prevent the result described above , for it prevents the best­
financed team from acquiring the players whose contracts are the 
exclusive property of other teams unless the other owners acquiesce . 
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If owners seek profit s ,  the player reservation system has no 
effect on the distribution of playing strengths among teams . Without 
a player reservation system, the team for whom a player can generate 
the most revenues will offer him the highest salary, and in 
equilibrium all players will play for the team for which they have the 
greatest value . If any player is earning a wage from one team that 
falls short of his value to another , profit-maximization by the latter 
will prompt it to offer him a higher salary if he will switch teams . 
With a player reservation system, the player cannot accept the 
higher wage and move to the team that values him most highly . But the 
teams can engage in the sale and trade of player contracts . If a team 
is paying a player exactly what he is worth to that team, but his 
value to another team is greater,  both teams can benefit from a sale 
of the player' s contract . Through sale the player' s current team 
shares  with the player' s new team his greater value in another city. 
Thus , under both regimes the player ends up with the team for which he 
generates the greatest revenue . The only difference is that without a 
player reservation system, the player receives that greater value 
through a competitive labor market ,  while with a player reservation 
system the player's original team receives it from the sale of his 
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contract . 
A third possible motivation of sports owners is that they 
maximize victories subj ect to a requirement that the team earn some 
minimum amount of profit (perhaps zero , or perhaps even negative) . 
The predicted result of this motivational assumption is intermediate 
between those of the two other hypothese s .  Each team would attempt to 
acquire a stronger team than would a profit-maximizer , assuming that 
the most profitable strength earns prof its in excess of the minimum 
satisfactory amount . Among the predictions of this hypothesis are 
that no highly profitable team would ever sell a player unless it was 
for the purpose of hiring a better one . Another prediction is that no 
team would earn more than minimum profits as long as any opportunity 
existed for making an expenditure to improve the team. 
Ticket prices , too , should be affected by the motivation of 
the owner . Sports entrepreneurs who regard profits as less important 
will be more likely to set prices on a cost-plus basis�that is , 
without prof it motivation, a team that is highly successful on the 
field and also earns a large profit would be expected to cut prices .  
Evidence o n  Motivation 
From the preceding , data on player sales,  profits and ticket 
prices should provide some clue as to the motivation of sports owners .  
I n  fact , these data all support the profit-maximization hypothesi s .  
The only definitive data on player transactions were collected 
by the Congress for selected years between 1 929 and 1950 in connection 
with an investigation of professional baseball.  During this period 
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the worst team in the American League in terms of won-lost percentage 
was the St .  Louis Browns .  The Browns showed cumulative profits over 
this thirty-year period of about $1 . 1  million and net sales of player 
contracts of approximately $2 .3 million. From this one can conclude 
that , while the Browns' entire profit was accounted for by the sale of 
players,  nevertheless the team could not have been an unabashed 
maximizer of victories.  It sold more than $1 million more in players 
than were necessary for break-even operations , some of whom presumably 
could have added a few victories to the Browns' miserable record. 
During the same period, the Brooklyn Dodgers were a better­
than-average team, tying for the fourth-best won-lost percentage among 
the sixteen teams then in major league baseball.  They also had the 
fourth highest prof its in baseball--and a net income from sales of 
player contracts of over $800 ,000 . In fact , they were the second­
leading team in the National League in terms of net player sale s .  Had 
they sought primarily victory on the field, they would not have sold 
so many players while earning profits and failing to win the most 
games . 
Recent history in professional basketball  also illustrates the 
tendency for players to move towards the cities valuing them most 
highly. The Los Angeles Lakers have continually maintained their 
playing strength--and their status as one of the most profitable 
basketball franchises--by acquiring talent from other teams . Among 
the players of star or superstar status acquired by the Lakers from 
other teams through either cash purchases or, when economic aspects of 
the transaction are not considered, unequal trades are : Wilt 
Chamberlin, Bill Bridges , Happy Hairston, Gail Goodrich, Connie 
Hawkins ,  Kareem Abdul-Jabbar, Jamaal Wilke s ,  and J im Chones .  
Another prime basketball market i s  N ew  York City, and the 
Knickerbockers and Nets have also been active in the acquisition of 
players from other teams through transactions with strong economic 
overtones . Among the stars that the New York teams acquired from 
franchises in smaller market s  are Jerry Lucas,  Dave DeBuscherre, Earl 
Monroe , Julius Erving , and Rick Barry . 
There is also no evidence that teams become so good that they 
actually begin to lose money. Table 5 shows the ranking of baseball 
teams by cumulative won-lost record and estimated cumulative profits 
during the 1 929-50 period.  In both leagues artistic and financial 
success went hand-in-hand, with the best teams also being the most 
profitable. There is no evidence that any team�even the dynastic 
Yankees�surpassed the profit-maximizing team strength. 
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The ticket prices charged by the most profitable teams show no 
evidence of the kind of cost-plus pricing that would be predicted by 
the models that assume the maximization of games won. In baseball , 
the eight teams that were most profitable during 1970 and 1 97 1  earned 
about $1 .8  million per team more in net revenue than the baseball-wide 
average .-
1 
Their ticket prices were not statistically significantly 
_J Nol l ,  "Attendance and Price Setting , "  in Noll,  Government 
and the Sports Business , pp . 1 25-1 26 . 
TABLE 5 
RANKING OF BASEBALL TEAMS BY LEAGUE IN CUMULATIVE 
PROFITS AND CUMULATIVE WINS , 1929-1950
T e am 
Ame rican League : 
New Y o rk 
Detroit 
Cleveland 
Boston 
Washington 
Philadelphia 
Chicago 
St. Louis 
National Le ague :  
St. Louis 
B r ooklyn 
Chicago 
New Y o rk 
Pittsburgh 
B o ston 
Cincinnati 
Philadelphia 
Won-Lost Re c ord 
Fraction W on I Rank 
. 6 1 7  1 
. 5 3 7  2 
. 5 34 3 
. 5 08  4 
• 48 1 5 
. 45 1 6 
. 449 7 
. 420 8 
. 5 87  1 
• 529 2 
. 529  3 
. 524 4 
. 508  5 
• 463 6 
. 46 3  7 
. 394 8 
I E stimated Profits Amount I Rank 
( Millions) 
$8. 5 1 
4. 7 2 
3 . 7 3 
-2 .  1 8 
2. 7 4 
1 .  0 9 1  6 
1 .  3 5 
1 .  088  7 
6 . 0 1 
3 .  9 2 
2. 92 4 
2 . 89  5 
3. 2 3 
- . 3 8 
1 .  6 6 
0 7 
Source :  James P .  Quirk and Mohamed E l  Hodiri , "The Economic Theory
of a Sports League, "  in Noll ,  Government and the Sports 
Business , Ch . 2.  
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different from other teams . Obviously they did not cut ticket prices 
or purchase more player contracts to improve performance in response 
to greater profits . In basketball, the New York Knickerbockers are, 
by far, the most profitable franchise . They also charge,  by over 
$2 .00 per ticket , the highest prices in basketball .  Clearly, they are 
quite profit oriented, but this is to be expected since they are a 
subsidiary of a publicly-held corporation. The Lakers are more 
typical of sports  in their ownership , being a privately-held 
corporation that is controlled by a wealthy individual. They are the 
second most profitable basketball team and charge the second-highest 
price s .  
The final evidence that sports enterprises are generally 
profit oriented is the contrast  between average behavior in sports and 
the behavior of the very few teams in history that were not totally 
profit oriented. In baseball, the late Tom Yawkey of the Boston Red 
Sox and Phil Wrigley of the Chicago Cubs were regarded as "sportsmen" 
owners . These  teams charged, by far ,  the lowest prices in baseball.  
They also had atypically low local broadcasting revenues .  The Cubs 
still refuse to s chedule night games at home , even though all other 
teams have found that night games are more profitable. The Red Sox 
were the only team to lose a significant amount of money during the 
1 929-SO period . During this same priod, the Red Sox and Cubs ranked 
second and third in purchases of player contracts . Still,  they were 
unable to achieve dominance in their leagues ,  finishing fourth and 
tied for second, respectively, in cumulative won-lost percentage. 
The histories of the Cubs and Red Sox illustrate two important 
phenomena . First ,  these teams behaved so differently from others that 
it is reasonable to conclude that the others are motivated mainly by 
profit . Second, their inability to dominate play--or even to win 
their share of pennants ( between 194S and 1980 the Cubs captured one
pennant , the Red Sox two )--indicates that a few sportsmen owners do 
not succeed in unbalancing competition on the field by acquiring most 
of the good p layers . 
The performance of sports enterprises supports  the conclusion 
that neither the purpose nor the effect of the player reservation 
system is to prevent economically irrational owners from destroying 
the balance of strength among teams in a sport . Instead, as economics 
predicts , its effects are to lower player salaries to the benefit of 
owners and , through sales from weak to strong teams , to increase the 
revenues of the former . While this can make more teams in a league 
viable--for example,  by converting the disastrous Browns to a 
profitable venture in the 1 929-SO period�it is not any more effective 
than more direct revenue-sharing arrangement s ,  such as split ting gate 
receipts and broadcasting revenues among participating teams . 
Cartel Cheating 
A sports league is ,  in economic terms , an organization of 
competing firms for the purpose of designing and enforcing rules that 
limit competition. The monopoly rights enjoyed by teams are created 
by the league cartel,  for in the absence of league rules teams could 
be expected to compete in the broadcasting and player markets,  and in 
S6 
the larger cities competition in the admissions and stadium markets 
would also ensue . 
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In a competitive market ,  equilibrium price and output is 
economically efficient in that price is equated to marginal cost . 
Should a situation arise in which firms earn prof its in excess of the 
amount necessary to keep them economically viable, expansion of 
existing firms and entry of new firms will increase output , force down 
prices and return profits to the competitive equilibrium. The process 
by which competition lowers prices and prof its operates because each 
firm perceives an incentive either to expand output or to enter the 
market in response to excess demand, even though its behavior, and 
that of its competitors , eventually leads to lower profits for all.  
In a cartel , firms perceive the same incentive to engage in 
behavior that,  were it followed by all,  would destroy the monopoly 
profits generated by the cartel's anticompetitive arrangements .  
Consequently, the cartel i s  inherently unstable. Its members will 
perceive an incentive to respond to new opportunities to gain a 
competitive advantage , either by violating the rules (especially if 
the violation is l ikely to go undetected) or by behaving competitively 
should a situation arise that is not covered by league rules.  
To combat this behavior all cartels--including those in 
sports--must devise penalties for violating the rules , information 
systems for detecting violations and procedures for revising rules in 
response to new economic conditions . Each league in professional 
sports has a published, continuously updated list of operating rules 
( in addition to playing rules ) which serve these functions . And, 
judging from the frequency with which rules are changed and penalties 
invoked, sports leagues are continually beset by the problem of 
cheating--that is, behavior by one or more members that erodes the 
monopoly profits of all .  Of course,  in the sense used here,  cheating 
is not a pejorative term. Behavior that is cheating in a cartel is 
called innovative in an industry that is competitive . 
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Cheating by violation of league rules is not common in 
professional sports,  but it is by no means unknown. Violation of most 
of the monopolistic rules practiced by a league is extremely obvious 
when it takes place . A team cannot play or broadcast a game in 
another team' s home territory without easily being detected, nor will 
it be able to sign a player from another team' s roster without instant 
recognition. Enforcement of these rules involves granting the 
Commissioner of a sport the power to impose stiff penalties on 
violators . Commissioners have the power to impose heavy fines�in the 
form of money , players or even expulsion from the league . Since 
detection is virtually certain, a gain virtually impossible , and 
significant loss almo st inevitable, the most obvious forms of cheating 
almost never occur . 
Two recent cases illustrate the mechanics by which leagues 
enforce these rules in the rare instances in which they are broken . 
George McGinnis and Julius Erving, two exceptionally talented 
basketball forwards , played the first few years of their careers for 
teams in the American Basketball Association. Nevertheles s ,  the NBA 
draft rights to each were still valid , the Philadelphia 76ers having 
rights to McGinnis and the Milwaukee Bucks to Erving . Both players 
were signed by another NBA team, with the New York Knickerbockers 
signing McGinnis and the Atlanta Hawks coming to terms with Erving . 
The league then severely fined both teams and declared each contract 
invalid. The amount of the fines is not precisely known, but they 
involved both cash and the los s  of negotiating rights with other 
player s .  
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Violations o f  a few o f  the rules are extremely difficult to 
detect . One is the roster limit . Every sport sets a limit on the 
number of players that can be under contract to any one team. While 
teams cannot easily field more than the legal number of players 
without detection, they can rather easily sign contract s  with a number 
that exceeds the roster limit.  In case of an injury or an 
unexpectedly bad performance , a legal roster player can then be 
replaced by an alleged "free agent" who "just happened" to be ready to 
play . While they are not being used, the illegally signed players can 
be playing minor league ball,  sometimes under an assumed name, or 
simply attending secret,  separate practice sessions held by the team 
somewhere other than the team' s normal practice area. 
In 1 974 the Houston Oilers were accused of "stashing" 
players--of having 58 players under contract despite the 47-man roster 
limit of the NFL. An official of the team was reportedly fined $5000 
by the league office for this practice , a trivial sum in comparison 
with the salaries these eleven players were likely to have been paid. 
Similar stashing episodes have taken place in baseball, but they have 
become rarer with the demise of the minor league system. In the days 
when s cores of independent minor leagues were operating , a team had a 
good chance of keeping the talents of an illegal ly signed, talented 
young prospect unnoticed on some obscure minor league team.  (If the 
player were noticed , another team might try to buy his contract from 
the minor league club and discover that he was already under contract 
to a major league team. ) 
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To keep the player from being noticed while developing his 
skill,  the team would impose strange requirements on the minor league 
team to keep his record from appearing too good, such as playing him 
part of the time in the wrong position so that he would have a poor 
fielding record, or leaving him out of the lineup against weak 
pitchers to depres s his batting average .  These tactics , o f  course, 
could not work for long , but they gave the team a little extra time to 
decide whether to place a player on the roster and thereby to protect 
him from acquisition by a competitor. 
Interfering with the mechanism by which free agents are 
drafted is also a relatively easy way to cheat. For example, a few 
years ago several football teams received a letter from a top college 
prospect warning them against "wasting a draft choice" on the player 
since he had decided to play baseball instead of football .  One owner 
contacted the player and discovered that he was unaware of the letters 
and , in fact , was leaning towards football.  Apparently another team 
in the league , desirous of his service s ,  had tried to dissuade others 
from drafting �he player so that he would still be available by the 
time the draft had proceeded to the team' s turn. (The identity of the 
culprit was never publicly disclo sed . )  
The most common form of cheating is violation of the spirit , 
but not the letter , of league rules,  in response to a new competitive 
opportunity. In so doing a team usually can expect to gain only a 
temporary advantage . Either league rules will be changed to make the 
team' s action illegal , or other teams will all adopt the same 
practice , often to the detriment of all.  
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Currently the opportunity for subscription television ( pay TV) 
on cable television systems has led to this kind of cheating . League 
rules prohibit broadcasting into another team' s  territory ; however, 
cable pay-TV is not ,  technically, broadcasting . In 1 973  the New York 
Knickerbockers sold rights to their home games to a pay-TV firm, who 
then proceeded to offer them on a cable system in the home territory 
of the Philadelphia 76ers . This prompted the league to employ 
economists at the Rand Corporation to help it devise rules for dealing 
with cable television; meanwhile the Knicks and their licencee derived 
some temporary advantage.  
Perhaps the most important example of innovative behavior that 
evaded league rules was the development of baseball' s minor league 
farm system by Branch Rickey . During the 1 920s several minor leagues 
refused to allow their players to be drafted by major league teams . 
Instead , they sold player contracts to the highest bidder , thereby 
extracting some of the gains of the majors' reserve system. Rickey' s 
innovation was simple but devastating : his team, the S t .  Louis 
Cardinals , acquired or established exclusive agreements with several 
minor league teams . These minor league clubs could sign players to 
minor league contracts without exceeding the Cardinals' roster limit ,  
and then refuse t o  sell the contracts t o  any team except the 
Cardinals . 
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Rickey soon realized that his innovation had even better 
possibilities . He rapidly developed a larger minor league farm system 
than was required to develop players only for the Cardinals ,  and the 
Cardinals became baseball' s biggest net seller of player contracts to 
other teams . Rickey had discovered an intricate mechanism to 
monopolize playing talent without paying for it ( players were signed 
as youngsters to become minor league players ) and without violating 
the roster limit . As a result , the Cardinals became the best team in 
the National League , despite being located in a relatively small 
market that was nonetheless shared with another major league team. 
They also became the league' s  most profitable team, earning well over 
half of their profits from the sale of player contracts . 
By the time the other teams realized what had taken place , the 
Cardinals were entrenched in the minor league s .  Formation of an equal 
number of minor league teams by other major league franchises was 
impossible unless  economically unviable teams were created . And 
prohibition of the farm system would have meant returning to a 
situation in which independent minor league teams sold players 
competitively to the majors . The only remaining step--a limitation on 
the number of teams that a major league franchise could own--was of 
dubious legality should Rickey challenge it and , in any event , a 
confiscation of property that the owners were unlikely to find 
agreeable. Judge Landis ,  who opposed the farm system on the grounds 
that it would prove to be too expensive and to destabilize competitive 
balance, brought the issue to a head by declaring several farm system 
players available to other teams because their major league teams were 
violating the roster limit . The owners overrode him, and he did not 
choose to invoke his ultimate power�to declare the practice illegal 
because it threatened the "integrity of the game . "  Not until the 
economic collapse of the minor leagues in the 1 950s did the leagues 
achieve a relatively even distribution of minor league farm teams . 
The demise of the minors provides another example of 
innovative competition in baseball. The minors were killed by 
television. National and regional telecasts  destroyed attendance at 
minor league games on Saturdays and Sundays , and as a result teams 
began to lose money . Maj or league teams responded by subsidizing the 
farm system. By 1 97 0 ,  major league teams were receiving about $1 .4 
million each in broadcasting revenue , but they were subsidizing minor 
leagues to the tune of $1 .3  million each. 
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The rules of baseball governing territorial rights were 
written when radio , not television, was the broadcasting vehicle of 
principal interest to the owners .  These rules permitted broadcasts of 
major league teams into the home territories of lower status leagues , 
even when the minor league team was playing at home. This was , of 
course,  a benign provision; radio was hardly a threat to minor league 
attendance . 
With the advent of television, opportunities for lucrative 
broadcasting contracts increased, and teams began televising games 
regionally and nationally. Television eroded minor league attendance 
by direct competition and by the invidious comparisons of the skill 
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with which the game was played . The latter point was emphasized by a 
Los Angeles sports writer who reported the following conversation 
after the first televised World Series . "I' 11 wager that the Series 
telecast killed baseball on the Coast .  By your standards Bobby Brown 
is just an average third baseman. By our standards he pulled fielding 
plays such as we on the Pacific Coast had never seen before . "  The 
response:  "Wait until you see a miracle worker like Billy Cox. He' ll  
finish off  the Pacific Coast League all by  himself . ,,_j 
_J New York Time s ,  December 9 ,  1 95 2 ,  p .  46 . 
In the late 1 940s ,  baseball could have devised a policy toward 
broadcasting that took account of the effect of broadcasts on the 
minor leagues .  But once extensive telecasting had begun, politically 
and legally there was no return--and the minor leagues were 
essentially dead . As the figures on revenues,  costs and minor league 
survival rates attes t ,  it is by no means obvious that baseball has 
benefitted from television, despite its ability to establish monopoly 
prices in both the local and national broadcasting markets . The 
natural tendency of businessmen is to respond competitively , rather 
than collusively, to the opportunity for short-run gain outside the 
reach of cartel rules . The rise of television and fall of the minor 
leagues--to little net effect--is an excellent illustration of the 
point . 
Cartel Innovation 
In some instances innovations that benefit all teams , or at 
least that hurt no one , require league approval if they are to be 
tried. Examples include changes  in playing rules (the American 
League' s designated hitter, the old AFL' s two-point conversion) , 
increases in league membership through expansion or merger ,  and 
relocation of franchises . 
These changes normally require consent by a large majority of 
league members--usually three-quarters . Two features of cartels make 
this a difficult obstacle to surmount . Firs t ,  the entrepreneurial 
skills and foresight of cartel members are certain to differ. In a 
competitive environment , only one skilled entrepreneur need perceive 
an opportunity for innovation. He will pursue it firs t ,  and his 
competitors will be forced to follow or face permanent competitive 
disadvantage,  even demise.  But to achieve a three-quarters majority, 
each innovative idea must  appeal to some entrepreneurs of below­
average vision and ability. 
65 
A second feature that retards innovation is the incentive 
facing each member to fake injury in the hopes of receiving 
compensation. For example,  when the American League decided to become 
a truly American league by placing the California Angels in Los 
Angeles , the Angels had to pay damages  to the Dodgers--in retrospect , 
a wholly unnecessary ransom to one of the nation' s most successful 
franchises . More generally, an owner, if his vote is critical,  may 
collect some bribe from the proponents of change by holding out at the 
beginning. 
As a result of these features , cartels can be expected to be 
exceptionally conservative . While this retards the adoption of bad 
ideas , it also weeds out much that is worthwhile. If good business 
ideas outn1.UD.ber the bad�and continued technical progress indicates 
that they do�the result is inefficiently slow progres s .  
In most instances the introduction o f  a competitive league i s  
a response· t o  a failure t o  change o n  the part o f  the established 
league . For a new league to survive , it must  be able to acquire 
viable franchise sites and quality players . Its success depends , 
therefore, upon a failure by an established league to expand as fast 
as it should. Furthermore , new leagues or financially troubled older 
ones often adopt playing and institutional innovations that eventually 
are adopted by more succes sful�and more conservative--competitors . 
Thus , the ABA added the three-point long-shot baske t ,  the World 
Football League used a limitation on total salary payments by a team 
rather than a player reservation system, and, in response to financial 
difficulties , the American League inserted the Designated Hitter into 
the lineup to add offense to a game many regarded as too dull for 
contemporary tastes . Meanwhile , innovative owners--from Bill Veeck 
(who invented "bat days"  and exploding s coreboards ,  and who once 
pinch-hit a midget to draw a certain walk) to Charles Finley (who 
favored orange balls and two-platoon baseball)�are not only 
criticized by their peers,  but pressured to leave the sport . 
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Conclusions on Conduct and Performance 
The actions of sports entrepreneurs indicate that the 
appropriate model for analyzing the industry is the familiar theory of 
profit-maximizing , competitive firms that belong to a cartel.  The 
cartel has stability problems , owing to the fact that owners take 
advantage of opportunities to violate rules when they think they can 
get away with it and to respond competitively , rather than 
collusively, to situations not fully covered by league rules�often in 
so doing preventing the adoption of new rules to restore the cartel's  
ability to create protected monopolies.  The cartel also tends to be 
lethargic , finding difficult the adoption of mutually beneficial 
changes . 
Because a few cartel rights are difficult to breach� 
territorial rights and league membership, for example�the cartel can 
generate monopoly rents despite its weaknesses . And because it can 
create barriers to entry, the introduction of competitive leagues is 
only a loose check on its operations . The result is economic 
inefficiencies of the following type : 
Too few cities have teams , and too few teams are located in 
the largest markets . 
Too few players are induced to play. 
The operating and playing rules change too slowly.  
Too few games are telecast , especially simultaneously . 
Prices in the product market are too high--for both tickets 
and broadcasting rights , although broadcasting is itself a 
source of inefficiency owing to its imperfectly competitive 
market structure.  
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PUBLIC POLICY : PAST AND FUTURE 
Professional sports  has been successful in the past in 
obtaining governmental sanction of its anticompetitive practices . The 
long-standing antitrust exemption of baseball's reserve clause, 
recently upheld in Flood vs . Kuhn, is only one example. Legislative 
action has explicitly exempted cartel relations for selling 
broadcasting rights and, in football ,  legis lation passed in 1 966 
exempted from antitrust actions the merger of the NFL and AFL. 
Finally, local governments have raised barriers to entry of new 
leagues by giving teams exclusive leases to use publicly-owned 
facilities and , in many cases , by renting these  facilities to 
established teams at rates below cos t .  
Until the 1 970s ,  the only major setback suffered by 
professional sports  was the decision in Radovich vs . NFL that declared 
illegal football's counterpart to the baseball reserve clause. While 
Congress did not override this deci sion with exempting legislation, as 
it later overrode judicial decisions that found league-wide 
broadcasting packages illegal , the effect of Radovich was too small to 
discern. By 1 963 , football had replaced the reserve system with the 
equally effective option-compensation system. The so-cal led Rozelle 
Rule went without legal challenge until a spate of antitrust cases was 
launched by players in the mid-1 97 0s .-/
_J Kapp vs.  NFL and Mackey, et al.  vs . NFL were discussed 
above ; in addition, in Smith vs . Pro-Football,  Inc . ,  CA 1643-70 ,
District of Columbia, former Washington Redskins defensive back Yazoo 
Smith sued to recover the amount by which his first year salary was 
depressed because of lack of competition for his services. 
Since 1 970 , government has become less willing to sanction 
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anticompetitive practices in  sports .  In 1 97 1 ,  the ABA and NBA 
requested Congressional approval of a merger of the league s .  After 
protracted hearing s ,  the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly 
drew up a bill granting permission to merge�but only on the 
conditions that ( 1 )  the option-compensation system be eliminated; ( 2) 
the leagues adopt a revenue-sharing system in which the ABA received a 
proportionate share of broadcasting rights and the visiting team 
received 30 percent of the gate ; and ( 3 )  the free agent draft be 
changed so that a rookie would be bound to the team that drafted him 
for only two years . Because the NBA did not approve the terms of the 
bill ,  it died in committee and the leagues were not then merged. 
Eventually, four ABA teams applied for NBA membership , and the ABA 
folded, but the legal status of the single major professional 
basketball league that emerged is unclear until tested in court.  
The record of pro sports has also not been good of late in 
winning court tests of its anticompetitive practices.  In  Philadelphia 
World Hockey Club ,  Judge Higgenbotham ruled hockey's player 
reservation system unenforceable because it violated antitrust laws . 
His ruling permitted the World Hockey Association to retain the 
National Hockey League players it had signed, amounting to about 25 
percent of the previous season' s NHL rosters . In Kapp vs . NFL and 
Mackey vs . NFL, the Rozelle Rule has been held to be a per se 
antitrust violation. In Laird vs . U . S ._) the proportion of the 
_J Civ. 17892 ,  U . S .D.C.  Northern Georgia. 
original cost of a football team that can be allowcated to player 
contracts and depreciated was reduced from 99 to 43 percent . 
This decision reduces the potential after-tax income to the owners 
of the Tampa Bay and Seattle NFL expansion franchises by over 
$1 million per year for the first five years they own the teams . 
The franchises originally sold for $16 million; depending upon 
the tax s tatus of the owners and how long each owner expected to 
retain the team, the ruling diminishes the value of each team by 
four to s even million dollars .-
1 
_J If the team is sold each time the player depreciation is 
exhausted, the sales price will almost all be taxed as capital gains .  
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For a wealthy individual, the capital gains tax rate is about half the 
rate on earned income . The ruling prevents the team from claiming 
about $8 million in depreciation over five years ,  which would reduce 
taxes by about $ 5 . 5  million could it be claimed . When the team is 
sold , capital gains taxes would claim $2 .8 million more than if 
depreciation had not been taken. This cycle could be repeated every 
f ive years by different owners .  The present value of an indefinite 
s tream of revenues of plus $1 .1  million every year and minus $2 .8  
million every five years i s ,  at  a 10 percent discount rate, about $6 .S 
million. If the team is never sold, the five years of depreciation 
are worth, in present value terms , about $4 million. 
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Despite the gains in the past few years in undoing some of the 
special privileges enjoyed by sports ,  the long-run significance of the 
favorable judicial attitude is open to serious question. Even if the 
player reservation is completely eliminated , product market 
competition will still come only from new leagues ,  and historically 
competitive leagues always have either failed or merged . Although 
only football currently enjoys legislative permission for mergers ,  the 
other sports may well succeed in convincing Congress that this 
legislative protection should be extended to them. Judging from the 
bill dra.n up by the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly on 
the proposed merger of the two professional basketball leagues ,-1
_J S . 2372 ,  reported September 1 8 ,  1 97 2 .  The bill eventually 
died in co111111ittee when the leagues could not agree to merge under the 
terms of the bill. For further discussion, see Roger G. Noll ,  
"Alternatives in Sports Policy , "  in Nol l ,  Government and the Sports 
Business ,  pp . 426-428.  
Congress apparently was willing to  permit merger if the leagues would 
guarantee that merger would not cause a reduction in the number of 
franchises and a restoration of the option-compensation system for 
cont�olling players . Congress has shown no evidence to date of 
undoing most of the anticompetitive practices pertaining to the 
product market for sports,  such as league-wide bargaining in the sale 
of broadcast rights ,  exclusive territorial franchises , and the tight 
controls leagues place on expansion. 
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Even if the contractual relationships of players and teams are 
made fully competitive, the practices that most affect sports fans are 
unlikely to be affected. Only when an entire league can be formed 
does competition work in favor of the fan by increasing his access to 
sporting events .  As argued above, this is a weak control on the 
anticompetitive practices of established leagues .  
Prior t o  the surprising attempt o f  the Oakland Raiders t o  move 
to Los Angeles , the antitrust environment seemed unlikely to deal with 
the issues affecting fans . The major participants in the business  of 
sports do not have an incentive to make the industry competitive . 
Clearly both existing and potential owners benefit from the various 
restrictions against competition because these rules are the source of 
the profitability of ownership . A team or league that achieved its 
objective only by destroying these product market protections would 
severely reduce its own future profits .  Furthermore, players have no 
interest in increasing product market competition. The additional 
profitability of sports that results from these anticompetitive 
practices increases the market value of established players and 
generates a source of additional revenues that can be shifted at least 
in part from owners to players through collective bargaining. Yet 
some people seem to be willing to f low against the incentives .  Not 
only is Al Davis , the owner of the Raiders , willing to threaten 
territorial rights , but s o ,  too , have the hundred-odd soccer players 
made exclusive territorial franchises a complaint in their suit 
against the NASL. 
Nevertheless ,  in order to increase competition in sports,  
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direct government intervention is probably necessary. The current 
cases are probably anomolous . Basically, government action could take 
one of three forms : legislation setting down the terms under which 
leagues can gain certain antitrust exemptions ; creation of a 
government agency to deal with sports as a regulated industry, 
controlling some or all aspects of its behavior in both product and 
labor markets ; or an attack by the Department of Justice on sports as 
anticompetitive on grounds other than those normally raised when 
players or competitive leagues seek antitrust relief. 
Needless to say, the pros and cons of these alternative 
mechanisms are complicated, and a definitive review of them is not 
within the bounds of this chapter.-1 A summary judgment is that the
_J A more complete discussion can be found in Noll,  Government 
and the Sports Business , especially Steven R. Rivkin, "Sports Leagues 
and the Federal Antitrust Laws , "  and Roger G. Noll,  "Alternatives in 
Sports Policy . "  
performance of regulatory institutions in other industries is not 
particularly good , especially when the purchasers of the regulated 
industry' s products are not particularly well-represented by armies of 
lawyers and experts in the proceedings of the agency , so that 
enactment of a law establishing a Federal Commission on Sports would 
probably be unwise,  perhaps disastrous . Similarly ,  the demands upon 
the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice are so great 
compared to its resources that litigating suits against professional 
sports probably should not have a high priority in that agency, 
especially since the actual outcome in terms of the institutional 
arrangements that the judicial system might favor is so much in doubt.  
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This leaves legislative remedy . The performance of the Senate 
Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly in response to the requests for 
a basketball merger gives some hope for this alternative . While the 
Subcommittee did not directly attack many of the league practices that 
most affect fans, they did go a long way toward hammering out a 
workable set of rules for league operations . A significant 
achievement was their recognition of the importance of league rules 
regarding the sharing of revenues as a more important factor in 
determining the size and stability of leagues than the rules regarding 
competition for players . Since the issue at hand before Congress 
involved a sport for which consumer demand was relatively weak at that 
time , it is not particularly surprising that the proposed legislation 
did not deal with the rules governing expansion, territorial rights , 
and exclusive stadium lease s .  Judging from the relatively 
sophisticated approach of the Subcommitee to the problems of 
professional basketbal l ,  it is at least conceivable that a more 
sweeping examination of all sports might produce sensible legislative 
decisions on these issues as well.  
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